Ideas as the Subject of Philosophical Studies

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Abstract: Contemporary European society, which builds the subjectively understood dimension of happiness by extending it with utilitarian and hedonistic paradigms, rejects ideals and values. Not much is said about ideas or values in contemporary European philosophy. One can ponder whether ideas have lost their recognition in philosophy and whether the sociological engagement with the idea has been marginalised to such an extent that ideas have become deprived of their natural belonging to the man and society. A man deprived of ideas is a man deprived of his humanity, because it is the idea that makes human and social paradigms relevant. Therefore, it is important to refer to the history of ideas in order to show through history why the idea plays such an important role in the philosophical humanisation of the man. Therefore, it is the author's intention to present the history of ideas and through it to indicate significant paradigms of social values.

Key words: idea, value, ideation, nativism, axiology

Access

An idea is a thought that has taken a specific form. There are certain cognitive intuitions which capture the truth in its essential truthfulness; however, they are not communicable. A thought mediated in the language becomes communicable. This mediatisation is a condition of an idea formation. A thought capturing the truth is itself captured by the language. Therefore, an idea is a thought expressed in the language of concepts. An idea is a synthesis of the thought and the language; the dialectic movement of both in a simultaneous act of connecting. The more dynamic the movement, the less fixed the idea. Objectified ideas are the most fixed, because the thought is made precise in the language in such a way that it makes an inseparable entity with it, as if frozen in agreement. Stopping the internal movement is simultaneous with the constitution of a certain truth, which is expressed by an idea and the set of objectified truths is the current paradigm of science. Therefore, science is nothing more than a set of thoughts frozen in a language. The existing paradigm is constantly fed by new ideas objectified in the process of **freezing**. Each such new idea extends an existing paradigm, while at the same time regrouping it and introducing into it a certain kind of dynamics [Podgórski,2016:49-64]. The discourse is expanding. Its internal components enter a kind of active game, making some of them flow up to the discourse surface and others – into the depth of its silence. Therefore, there are two characteristic dialectical movements. One is imminently connected with the thought and the language of expression, while the other is the dynamics of the objectified discourse. However, there is another movement – which is the function of a contact of the idea with the space of discourse. Which is why a relation between a subjective thought and an objective discourse becomes possible. In this way, the idea takes the form of rationality. However, according to many philosophers, the idea as a philosophical concept cannot be settled in rational categories because rationalism applies to natural paradigms. When settling the issue of rationality in categories of praxeology, one can say that it is true that our mind develops through the natural environment, but also, and maybe first of all, through social interactions. Reason develops through the life experience, knowledge, but also though axiological ideals: truth, good and beauty, and through love. It means that reason is the source of cognition of reality, but also of the ideas and values belonging to the man as a rational being. A rational perception of an idea is a type of creativity of one's own personality, but also an empathic cognitive experience depending on the person's capabilities. Ideas live in the human environment and it only depends on man whether he can experience its paradigms rationally, receiving inspiration from an emotional activity, with the use of imagination, memory and conscience. [Podgórski, 2013, s.84-95].

An idea demands from a specific person an internally authentic creative practice of reason, which does not mean that it has to translate into practicality understood as tangible usefulness. Internally authentic creative practice brings intangible profit. Incidentally, the intangibility of the idea makes it susceptible to manipulations. The 20th century instilled in people the fear of ideas and values which – as totalitarian rulers claimed – are more powerful than guns. This is why ideas, ideals and values are depreciated socially and pushed to the social margin of not deserving to be cared about and not serious. And if they are taken into account, it is only to

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expose the anachronism of the sphere of its rational search. Ideas are among the most repeatable and reinterpreted issues because they focus, *inter alia*, on the issue of: monologicity and dialogicity, irrationalism and rationalism, beauty, good and truth, freedom and instrumentalism, subjectivity and objectivity, speech and language, comprehension and incomprehension, the role of ideas in the society and politics and man's spiritual, moral, emotional and intellectual development.

I. THE IDEA IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

The subject contained in the monography title requires precise specification of notions forming the dissertation. The notion of the "idea" is particularly interesting because many arguments concerning interpretation of that notion exist in philosophy. The beginnings of those arguments date back to ancient Greece where some recognised ideas focused on the form representing the object of perception. Hence, the term "idea" was applied initially to name the material shape of objects available to senses. Others applied it to the perceptible, mental, geometric form of beings (Democritus's atoms, Anaxagoras's homoiomerous form

Only Plato built the philosophic understanding of the *idea*. In Plato's works, the theory of "idea" is almost omnipresent: it appears gradually in his early dialogues to become the central subject of philosophy in the middle and late dialogues. On the one hand, it is the base for explaining the nature of the world, nature of human spirit and human cognition (Phaedo, The Phaedrus, The Republic, Timaeus) while on the other it is one of the major *problems that require solution or correction (Phaedo, Parmenides, The Sophist)*[1]. The "idea" has linked to the Plato's philosophy permanently and in all later forms of Platonism it represents one of the most important components. The theory of "idea" formulated by Plato is one of the most famous and influential theories in the history of philosophy. The thesis that above the changing world of material things the world of real being consisting of eternal and immutable Forms (Ideas) existed was the subject of fierce disputes during the entire life of western philosophy. The example here could be the statement by Hermann Cohen who, in the *PlatonsIdeenlehre und die Mathematik* rejected both the ontological and psychological interpretation of Plato's ideas. Ideas are neither separate beings (according to Cohen Aristoteles was responsible for that interpretation) nor simple elements in the mind of the person getting to know an object (psychological interpretation) [T. Gadacz, p. 32]. To illustrate the problem, Reale, following Plato [Reale, 2008:88] referred in his philosophy to the Greek notions of *ίδέα* and *έίδος*.

According to Reale […] that translation (in this case transliteration) is not fortunate because in the contemporary language the word <idea> gained the meaning different from the one in which Plato used it. That term should be translated accurately using the word <form><forma> […]. At present the word <idea> is understood as the notion, thought, mental representation, in other words something that leads us to the psychological and neology domain while Plato understood <idea>, in a certain sense, as something representing a specific object of thought, i.e. something to which the thought turns in the pure way, something without which the thought would not be a thought. Shortly speaking, the idea of Plato is not a pure thought being but the opposite – as we will see in detail – it is a being, or even *such a being that exists absolutely, the true being* [Reale, 2008:88].

Based on the Plato's statement, I have formulated my opinion concerning the idea, through which I can say that both terms *ίδέα* and *έίδος*originate from the verb *ίδέῖν* that means <to know> and in the Greek language before Plato were applied mainly for naming the *form of thing perceived by sight* i.e. the external form and shape that is seen by the sight and consequently *<what is seen>* by senses. Later, the words *ίδέα* and *έίὶδς*were used to describe in the figurative way the *internal form* that is the *type nature* of objects, the *nature of thing*. That second meaning, rarely used before Plato becomes for good the language of metaphysics. [Reale, 2008:88-89]. Plato then uses the words <idea> and <eidos> mainly to describe that *internal form*, that *metaphysical structure* or the *nature of thing* that possesses purely *intelligible* nature (he also uses terms like *ύσία*, meaning*substance or nature, and even *φύσις*meaning the *intelligible nature, the most internal reality of the thing* as synonyms*). [Reale, 2008:89]. Plato's system represents an attempt at solving the dilemma that

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[1] These are dramatized conversations between Socrates and his students or not very clever adversaries. They are of dialectic nature, i.e. philosophy is presented in conversation and argument, by formulating and dispelling theses. The dialogues are dramas of arguments and communicative mental processes. Various opinions are represented and consequently they reflect the meanders of discussions better than once agreed conclusions. Although sometimes the drama ends with the obvious conclusion, it frequently remains aporetic. "The Early Dialogues" represent defining the basic notions (courage – Laches, caution – Charmides, friendship – Lizys, or devotion – Eutyfron). The "Middle Dialogues" debate on the fundamental issues of life (love and erotic -*The Symposium, Phaedrus*, justice in personal and social dimension – Republic). The Late Dialogues focus on ontology (Parmenides), dialectics (Sophist), mathematics and cosmology (Theaetetus, Timaeus), and state (Statesman / Politicus, Laws). There are many types of ideas that correspond to objects.

bothered pre-Platonic philosophers. That dilemma resulted from considerations on the meaning of the notion of being by Parmenides. The Greeks had the tradition of understanding being in absolute categories, i.e. they assumed that something that actually "exists" should exist always and should be immutable. As Parmenides expressed it: *being exists and nothingness does not exist*, that is something that actually exists must exist eternally and must be immutable or otherwise it is just a "pseudo-being" that is permanently threatened by change or disappearance. That view was contrary to the reality observed with senses that is full of changes and instability. [Copleston, 2004:156-188].

Following Plato, I may say that ideas are objects of thoughts. In Platonic metaphysics the ideas are also understood as beings identical with one another, non-complex, immutable and perfect, cognizable by the mind and acting real equivalents of common notions as well as templates of variable material objects. Ideas air immaterial. They exist outside the reality in which people live; they occupy a separate sphere. They are not subject to any change. They possess no parts. They are eternal and immobile. Consequently, in all respects, they form ideal beings. Among ideas, similar to notions, the defined relations of superiority and inferiority take place. The world of ideas has hierarchic structure. The idea of good-beauty is at the very top. Consequently, there are two beings, two worlds. On the one hand the perfect in all respects world of ideal objects, i.e. ideas and on the other the imperfect, continually changing, perishable world of individual material objects. The material reflections of ideas are called *ideatums*. The entire world was designed based on the templates of ideas. The matter is the material also existing eternally as the ideas. However, it was something so completely indefinite, without any quality that in comparison with ideas it was almost nothingness. The creator of the world, the so-called Demiurge formed it to the shape of ideas.[Copleston, 2004:156-188].

The assumption that the ideas are the true eternal beings while the material reality is only the reflection of the eternal, immutable ideas was the base of Platonic system. According to Plato, relations between the world of ideas and the material world are the relation between the template and object. Ideas are templates and paradigms of physical objects. This required assuming existence of a specific mechanism of ideas "emanation" into material objects. That mechanism – according to Plato – is imperfect. This explains incompleteness, variability and imperfection of the material world. Plato drew the idea of change from Heraclitus. For Plato change was the evil because with each change all things diverge further and further from the primary ideas. Weakness, which according to Plato is something divine was the opposite of change. [Copleston, 2004:156-188].Consequently, the material world is evil and the spiritual world – as immutable – is good. The world of ideas consisted of the infinite number of ideal and perfect objects that are more real and true than the material objects. Those objects are eternal meaning that they have never been created and they cannot be destroyed. Ideas form the hierarchy. The highest idea is the idea of Good bestowing existence and cognoscibility on other ideas. Plato presented synthetically the science of ideas in The Allegory of the Cave. Life in the cave and watching the shadows symbolise life according to senses and sensual cognizance, deprived of the knowledge about the true world – the world of ideas.

Plato's leading ideas were: Good, Beauty and Truth that assume the nature of axiological ideas. For Plato, the idea represented the last stage that one should go through to reach perfection. Both worlds, the world of ideas and the material world are, according to Plato, separated and mutually overlapping. In this case it is hard for me to agree with the Plato's statement and formulate the definition of idea that is reflected in the philosophy of Aristotle. According to the famous description by Aristotle in The Metaphysics (volumes I and XII), the theory of idea is the only innovative element that diversifies Plato from his teacher Socrates. Aristotle is not a supporter of Plato's idea because he believes that:

None of the methods using which we prove existence of ideas is persuasive as some of them result in no necessary conclusion while others do not even show that the ideas of objects exist, which according to our opinion should not have an idea [Aristotle, Metaph, 990 b:8-11].

In this way Aristotle tries convincing us that the argument concerning the idea as Platonic theory does not prove that the idea exists independent of individual things. As a matter of fact, in strictly applied theory of Platonic ideas, according to Aristotle, forms of negation should exist. Consequently, forms are aimless multiplication of visible objects. Hence, forms become useless for cognition of objects. Aristotle concludes then that even if objects exist thanks to the form then how they are responsible for the movement of objects, their emergence and passing. He formulates the open question stating that "what if anybody asks what Ideas give the objects of eternal world as well as sensual objects as well as those appearing and perishing?" [Aristotle, Metaph, 991a:8-10]. In my opinion, Aristotle is unfair to Plato who was aware that the forms were not set in motion by sensual beings or ideas. The more so as Plato never believed the idea to be the principle of motion and never attempted to go in that direction. Plato, however, did not neglect the motion introduced by the Demiurge, the god creating the material world who sets in motion the material beings. Hence, Plato's ideas become forms of universal beings. On the other hand, the critique of Plato's ideas by Aristotle would be appropriate had Plato

claimed that forms were objects. Although Aristotle assumes critical attitude to Plato's ideas or forms, he fully agrees with Plato that general notions are not solely subjective notions or ways of expressing thoughts because the general notion in thought corresponds to the detailed being in the object although that being does not exist in the state of separation *(universale post rem),* because the general notion in the mind corresponds to the detailed being although the being does not exist in the state of separation *extra mentem*: it is separated solely in the mind and by the operation of the mind. Aristotle was convinced, similar to Plato, that the general notion is the subject of science and hence that if the general notion is not real in any way, if it does not have any objective reality then no scientific cognition exists as science does not deal with the individual unit as such [Copleston, 2004:274].The material world has no mind but according to Plato harmony and order exist in the nature. This is understandable only if we assume purposefulness of the world and hence of creating it. The Demiurge is the being that has built the material world. On the one hand, it took example from ideas, which causes certain convergence of material objects to perfection while on the other, it has built the world of eternally existing matter or mindless material (*dechomenon*), which causes that the reflection of the idea is imperfect.

Summarizing the philosophy of Aristotle concerning the Platonic ideas it must be concluded that Aristotle contested that theory. As Plato' student, he knew the contents of Plato's dialogues perfectly and he knew that his critique had already been presented earlier by Parmenides. However, if we consider that Aristotle in principle contested Plato's views it must be stated that his critique was justified. It should also be considered that Aristotle, presenting Plato's ideas, could lack understanding of them. Hence, he could present Plato's philosophy critically.

II. THE IDEA IN THE CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

Plato's thoughts were developed by representatives of Neoplatonism of which Plotinus was the best known. He reached into the philosophies by Plato, Aristotle and representatives of stoicism. Plato's philosophy was the main area of his interest. Through it Plotinus reflected innovatively to the perception of idea stating that Intellect not only obtains knowledge on itself but also all the ideas starting with the most general one, the idea of the being. Ideas do not represent a mythical pleroma but they represent an important element of Intellect. On the other hand, in his philosophy Intellect is not the supreme principle because Intellect is diversified into what it cognises (Intellect) and what is being cognised (Ideas). What is diversified cannot be the first because it is not absolutely simple. That statement forces Plotinus to formulate the concept of the "One", the highest form of being, supreme to Plato's ideas. This is the pure creative power from which emanates everything that exists: the matter, spirit, ideas and which can be cognised neither empirically not rationally but solely in mystic ecstasy. Plotinus's "One" is above the being but it has in it the fullness of everything it provides. Being absolutely indivisible at the same time it is the possibility of everything. Because of transcendence of the "One" no decisions concerning it can be formulated. However, as it is the possibility of everything, Plotinus describes it using numerous terms. The "One", however, is not *something* and hence, according to Platonic belief, it is not even a being. It rather grants being, while it is outside the being and the mind. The "One" is a being more perfect then the idea, because the "One" is not a relative being while the idea is such a being. The "One" expresses itself through the ideas of unity, good, beauty, and truth. It is the source of everything. It is the Absolute and hence cannot be cognised and it is above the being and outside the mind (epistemological and ontological transcendence). Consequently, ideas represent the ideal world (the world of the spirit), general notions, emanation of the Absolute. Philosophy by Plotinus has much in common with Christianity and that is why, with the birth of Christianity, the ideas became eternally existing in the intellect of God, ontically identical with the God, specific templates of individual things. The Person of Jesus Christ was also called the Idea. It was referred to as the Incorporated Thought – God the Father's Word. Christocentrism has become the fundamental idea of Christian philosophy by St. Augustine. In the metaphysics, Augustine made reference to Platonic idealism for which the idea of eudaimonism formed the foundation. Augustine taught that happiness is to be the goal of the man while it is the task of philosophy to find that happiness. Happiness is possible only thanks to God. Augustine claimed that cognition is necessary for happiness. Contrary to sceptics, he believed that it was possible only the appropriate method has to be found which is not subject to error and consequently representing the reliable beginning for the knowledge. Augustine came to the conclusion that own thought is the certainty of existence. Everything can be doubted except that I am and I think. "*Enter the inside of you, the truth is living in the interior of the human being*" – that idea that is known as o thought by Descartes was expressed already before him by Augustine. Augustine claimed that the mind cognises absolute truths better than own experiences. The mind, according to the Platonic view, thanks to thinking realizes eternal immutable ideas. It is not the generator of ideas but the recipient of them. Eternal ideas cannot be created. The only possibility is to accept knowledge about them without sensual intermediation. Augustin interpreted ideas as equivalent to God because eternal ideas exist only in God that is eternal. God grants the man knowledge on ideas solely by enlightenment i.e. illumination. Not everybody can experience illumination. It is the favour, the gift from God. In that way,

from the beginning of Christianity until the late medieval times, ideas were considered in the context of godly cognition (godly ideas), which found reflection in the theory of exemplarism[2].

Realistic reinterpretation of the exemplarism theory was formulated by Saint Thomas Aquinas. He outlined the holistic theory of divine ideas defining the idea as the *form that represents something according to the intention of the one taking action who himself defines his goal* [Quaestiones disputatae De Variatate – de ideis q.3, a.1]. Aquinas linked the ideas sensustricte with the order of practical cognition and he names them the *templates*. He names the ideas in the wider sense the *rationales* or *images* attributing them to speculative cognition. As concerns the divine cognition, the idea is the God presented together with the relation of likeness and lack of likeness that creatures show in relation to the divine being. The ideas do not differ from the divine being really but only cognitively thanks to which their multitude does not contradict the simplicity of God. From the side of the being only one idea exists while the multitude of ideas occurs because of many different references of creatures to that being. Divine ideas define the nature of every being in the individual way. The philosophic theory *creatio ex nihilo* formulated by Thomas Aquinas within the frameworks of which creation, from the side of the Absolute is a cognitive relation while from the side of the world the real relation allowed St Thomas abandoning the understanding of ideas as eternal, immutable beings participating in God and presenting ideas as things participating in the Absolute in the aspect of the nature and existence as well as presenting the creative act as creating by the Absolute the individual objects (ideas). The theory of divine ideas formulated by St Thomas allowed objective justification of cognitive realism [Sulenta 2016:418-419].

III. THE CONCEPT OF "IDEA" IN MODERN PHILOSOPHY

While in the realistic tradition ideas were mainly the object of practical cognition (creative) in the modern times ideas were transferred to the system of theoretical cognition. During modern times, as a consequence of substituting cognition of actually existing objects, subjectivation of the idea was performed giving it the psychological and noological dimensions. First it becomes the intermediary of cognition and next the constructed object of cognition. According to Descartes, we deal with innate ideas (God, truth, thinking), acquired ideas (acquired through senses, e.g. the idea of colour). They serve maintaining life and they are generated in scientific-creative process (only such ideas are subject to clear and transparent way). Descartes believes that the idea is a thought object existing objectively in the intellect. The Cartesian dualism contributed to ontologism of Nicolas de Malebranche considering cognition of ideas in human mind equivalent to intuitive seeing of divine forms of God's ideas. John Locke considered ideas objects that are the subject of thoughts or reproductive images or reproduced from sensual impressions that occur in the form of typical images or in the association process. For John Lock, ideas are divided into simple objective ideas originating directly from observations and those representing the result of subjective association and hence misty and general, complex ideas. Analysing the mind Locke created ideas based on sensual data and hence he gave the simple outline of

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[2]Exemplarism (Lat. *exemplaris* – template, example, model) – the trend in western ancient and medieval philosophy highlighting that the world was created according to ideal templates of objects in the God's mind. During the ancient period we can encounter that science in works by Philo of Alexandria who was under the influence of Platonic teaching on ideas (it is highly probable that he was the father of exemplarism). Plato, based on the analogy with human action taking place according to patterns (ideas) generated in the creator's intellect believed that the world of material beings has its templates in the separately existing necessary, eternal and understood by themselves ideas. Moreover, they form the primary principle (arche) of the mutable material world that participates in the ideas and hence assumes their characteristics (participation). The nature of ideas and material beings is different although their system is the same as the order of the material world is the reflection (formal-external causation) of the world of ideas. Plotinus modified the Plato's idea concerning participation according to his emanative concept of the being (emanation). The second of the successive concepts of the "One" – the spirit of the world – reveals from itself through the prism of ideas (located in the first hypostasis – the Mind) the lower and lower multiplied beings down to the matter. Plotinus understood imitation in a more active (dynamic) way than Plato. Exemplarism appeared also in the theology by St. Augustine. Augustine linked exemplarism to the concept of God, Christian revelation, the second person of the Holy Trinity – the Word (Logos). It contains intellectually cognisable templates that are ideas of everything that exists. The forms of created beings are numerous images of divine ideas (participation of them). On the other hand, the created object in itself is the imitation of its model in God (identically as the work of art representing nearing to the template present in the artist's mind). His theory of Logos was accepted by some philosophers and theologians. As a result of the significant modification of the theory of being by Thomas Aquinas exemplarism stopped functioning as the independent theory explaining the relation between the world and God. Thomas transformed the notion of participation into the existential notion of causality. According to him, God is not only the cause of the world but also its causative and target cause.

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generating them: sensual stimuli create impressions in the mind that are next automatically grouped into "objects" that Locke named simple ideas. Simple ideas are, e.g. one specific chair. Simple ideas are subject to the process of thinking meaning that they may be grouped, compared, analysed and on that base complex ideas can be created which are either averaged notions containing the entire sets of simple ideas possessing common characteristics (e.g. the "chair" defining the set of all chairs) or averaged notions containing relations existing between simple ideas (e.g. "crush" that is rapid contact of two simple ideas from the set of "objects"). The complex ideas generated in that way start living in the human mind with their "own life" meaning that they are subject to further transformations, generalisations, etc. as a consequence of which the abstract ideas are created ultimately – superficially entirely independent of sensual stimuli but in reality always representing the far echo of simple ideas. From the perspective of contemporary science, such an outline of functioning of the mind seems obvious however, during Locke's times it meant complete break from Platonic way of understanding the world of ideas as the "being in itself" and treatment of them as a mental phenomenon.In modern philosophy focussed on epistemological subjectivism the idea was treated as the equivalent of awareness and primary or sole object of cognition. According to the Cartesian thought, the idea assumes the innate character (nativism) but also the acquired or generated character – it is the "thing thought if it is objectively intellectual" [Mukerjee, 1964:13– 15]. Consideration of the nature of sensual perception brought Descartes and Locke to the conclusion that during that process we were aware directly of ideas and not physical objects. Descartes realised in that way that only own ideas, aware experiencing them, represent the subjectivity of the man and that thesis gained general acceptance. Philosophy of David Hume is the base for numerous decisions during modern times concerning the ideas of values. Hume states that in cognition we use two types of notions. The first of them correspond to impressions, i.e. our direct perceptions and feelings. Hence the impressions are all the sensual impressions, what we see, hear or touch. The impressions also include love, hatred, desire and other feelings. Impressions transform into ideas – the second type of notions. Human mind has the tendency to imagine many things, remembering, associating ideas. According to Hume, we may divide ideas into simple and complex ones. Simple ideas are generated as a result of remembering one specific impression. Complex ideas develop from combination of simple ideas. Those are notions such as substance, quality, and relation. According to Hume there is nothing like general ideas. The next step in Hume's argument is differentiating between facts and relations between ideas. The statement "The sun rises in the morning" is the statement concerning the fact while all mathematical theorems concern relations among ideas. Hume draws surprising consequences from those findings. It turns out that both statements concerning facts and those concerning relations among ideas will be accompanied by serious shortcomings to the extent that the validity of sciences and metaphysics become doubtful [Podgórski, 2016:153-163].

On the other hand, Immanuel Kant highlights the a priori cognitive role and hence he refers ideas to pure, non-categorical notions of mind (transcendental ideas. Kant calls "transcendental […] any cognition that deals in general not so much with the objects but rather our ways of getting to know objects if that was is to be, a priori, possible. Transcendental nature is due to what is always assumed by us when we think about something existing [Höffe, 1995:34]. The idea expresses a certain ideal, paradigm, prototype which in the philosophical language was spread through German idealism (Kant, Schiller, Hegel). F. Nietzsche and M. Weber, referring to the ideal indicate a certain type of values' concretisation [Scheler, 1988:23-57; Znaniecki, 1971:282–284.]

IV. ENDING

The focus of the undertaken work was on the "idea" that belongs to the fundamental philosophic category. The "idea" represents the definition of the general object of cognition as well as the independent ideal sphere representing the cause of the pattern defining the nature of individual objects. We can also say that it is the outcome of the intellectual and cognitive operation, the output of idealisation, an abstract, an object of ideation or a construct fulfilling a specified theoretical role in cognition and explanation of the practical part which has become an action or generation or a synonym of a notion, presentation of something (to own self). The "idea" can also be understood as the notion that is used for defining the internal or external form of an object. That notion is a paradigm determining the nature of tangible objects. In that way, the idea represents participation of numerous perfect units, constant, eternal, constant and identical forms – beings – patterns. It can also be assumed that it is an independently existing ideal or practical being, the principle organising cognition or action that applies to the acts or contents of awareness (thought, perception, form of expression, notice, and reminder). [Podgórski, 2015:37-44; Podgórski, 2016:153-163.

From the sociological point of view, the presented history of ideas was aimed at making the reader aware that there are ideas and values in the human life that a person uses. The values are the contents of ideal beings and are paradigms present in ideas. Discovering ideas and values can be a significant element of sociological reference. Therefore, in my opinion, philosophy should discover the world of ideas and values, while sociology should indicate their social importance in the process of socialisation. Therefore, I think that the

cognitive road for axiological ideas can be an important contribution of creative work for philosophers and sociologists in the globalising society of the 21st century [Podgórski, 2014:121-138;Podgórski,2015:171-181].

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